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In dealing with moral philosophy, one productive method of 
analysis is the examination of the metaphorical presuppositions 
behind a given system or approach to ethics, an examination of the 
author's basic paradigm. In the case of the "ethics of care" or 
"feminine" ethical approaches, the mostcommonmetaphoricalback­
ground for discussion is the "mothering" paradigm, or the model of 
a productive, growth-fosteringpositive relationship. I would like to 
contend that this ispOSSiblyinerror, in that it further supports certain 
stereotyped attitudes towards the "feminine" and in some senses 
may invalidate (or at least severely weaken) the argument for an 
ethic of care. I would like to propose an alternative metaphor, that of 
the role-playing game, primarily because role-playing involves, as 
Ernest Goffman writes, "a cycle of face-to-face social situations with 
role others, thatis,relevantaudiences" (E, p. 5). This is, inmany senses, 
precisely what "feminine" moral approaches are all about. 
I 
What does it mean to apply an "ethic of care"? For a nUmbl:'f of 
years, in the fields of both cognitive psychology and philosophy it 
meant that the moral agent in question had not yet matured enough 
morally to use the "higher," more abstract forms of ethical reasoning 
(decisions based on concepts of "justice"), an assumption based on 
the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget in designing pat­
terns of moral developmental stages.1 On the Kohlberg scale, people 
who functioned with care for others as theirprimary moral guideline 
scored at level three (out of six, six being the highest), and most of the 
people scoring three or lower on this scale were women. This, to 
Carol Gilligan. was indicative of a serious problem in psychological 
Bern/wdtis ascniorp/lilosophymajol'at Knox CoIlege. Sheisa resident o/W/wa fo 11, Illinois 
and will be attending Tile Ulliversity a/Illinois ill tile/all to Fltl'slIea doctomtcill pllilosopl1y. 
1 The stages of development, according to Kohlberg's Socratic-inspired model 
are: 1) Punishment und Obedience, 2) Instrumental Exchange, 3) Interpersonal 
Conformity, 4) Sodal System and Conscience Maintenance, 5) Prior Rights and 
Social Contract and 6) Universal Ethical Principles. 
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research, namely an attitude that created "recurrent problems of 
interpreting women's development" due to "repeated exclusion of 
women from the critical theory-building studies of psychological 
research" (Gilligan, p. 1). (All of Kohlberg' s test subjects were male, 
a common practice inpsychological research). Inorder to counteract 
this error, Gilligan did a number of studies of moral attitudes and 
decision-makingprocesses, using subject-groups ranging from chil­
dren at different developmental stages to a group of womenconsid­
ering abortion. as well as a study of female college students involved 
ina class on "moral and political choice" (Gilligan, pp. 2-3). 
What Gilligan discovered, in the course of years of interviews, 
was a "different voice" in moral behavior, one which, while "not 
characterized by gender," was nonetheless most often empirically 
observedinwomen(Gilligan, p. 5). SupportedbyNancyChodorow' s 
work on developmental psychology, specifically her thesis that 
women, due to their connection and identification with the mother, 
would more naturally tend towards a "relational" moral framework, 
Gilligan found an alternative moral standpOint to the morality of 
justice. It involved the following three necessary elements: Contex­
tual Relevance (all actions and choices mustbe considered within the 
context of a concrete Situation). Maintenance of Relationship (prior­
ity is given to action which allows for the continuation of positive 
relations with others) and Conception ofIdentity ("I" am a composite 
of myself and others as a social being and must behave as SUcll) 
(Gilligan, pp. 25-68). 
The synthesis of these three elements (contextual relevance, 
maintenance of relationship and conception of identity) revealed for 
Gilligan a picture of people who spoke with an ethical voice charac­
terized as a discourse detached from principle, focused on relations 
inparticular contexts, where this discourse was considered a rna ture, 
intelligible, productive moral standpoint rather than a juvenile, 
incomplete approach. The question invariably arises, however, as to 
where this alternative outlook can £it in to usual moral views given 
the frequent references made by many of the individuals inter­
viewed to obligations and values that were not necessarily solely 
constituted as a matter of "care." While Gilligan, adhering to 
Chodorow, writes of mother -contact as the fundamental develop­
mental basis for the "caring" response, it is also productive to 
examine Gilligan's information in terms of other factors, and it is in 
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these other comments that we can understand the place of care­
ethical directions within the conventional moral realm of description . 
. One such alternative hypothesis is that the ethic of care may be 
seen "as a set of circumscribed coping strategies for dealing with 
sexism" (Puka. pp. 58-82). According to Bill Puka (in attempting to 
deal with the feminist criticism of Gilligan that shows "caring" as "a 
sexist service orientation"), there are three developmental levels in 
Gilligan's hypothesis: self-protection, caring for others (where self­
defense is "selfish" and "irresponsible") and self-balanCing care for 
others (Puka, p. 59). Progress from one level to another is a matter of 
growing self-confidence and competence, and since these feelings 
are not always present, Puka claims, "women progress and regress 
in care, rather than following an invariant progressive sequence;" 
women suffer from feelings of vulnerability and impotency in a 
masculine world, and are thus often forced to regress to a "lower" 
moral level (Puka, p. 60). In this way, when women are faced with 
rejection, domination and other damaging behaviors, they have the 
option of swinging between the levels, depending upon how they 
feel best able to cope with these "attacks." The difficulty inherent in 
this, as Puka sees it, is that there will often occur a reversion to the 
"slave mentality" of the second level, serving only others above 
oneself, an example of excess in the areas of sacrifice and relationship 
maintenance (Puka, p. 62). Women, and iri fact anyone dependent 
upon a care-ethical apptoach of the sort shown by Gilligan, would 
find themselves constantly faced with the possibility of such a 
potentially harmful regression to a submissive standpOint. 
How are we to deal with this very apt criticism? It seems to walk 
hand in hand with the sentiment that Gilligan's findings, which 
make a definite differentiation between the justice and care stand­
points based on a noticeable correlation with sex difference, merely 
enforce the stereotype of the submissive, emotional, "irrational" 
female, even as Gilligan attempts to defuse this implication of 
immaturity (Gould, pp. 411-415),2 The danger exists that an ethic of 
care, posited as a "feminine" institution, can actually be harmful 
rather than helpful. Thispointmayberefutedinpartbyemphasizing 
Gilligan's insistence that her "different voice" is a "theme," rather 
than a necessary empirical characteristic, and that it exists in both 
2 This is one of the better of several different articles emphasizing this point. 
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male and female subjects (Gilligan, p. 6). Amore definitive refutation 
is to be found, however, in expanding the scope of the analysis 
beyond sex differences to include differences in age and social 
p osition as well. In various similar studies of moral orientation, age 
and status had as much to do with the sexual differentiation as 
anything else. In one study, for example, it was discovered that 
adults who were parents showed a definite sex-role differentiation 
in their moral standpoints, while adults who were not parents did 
not (Pratt, pp. 373-391). In another study of college students, moral 
focus was less related to sexual differences and found to be more 
closely tied to a certain high level of idealistic and non-relativistic 
thinking (Forsyth, pp. 243-248). When these additional factors are 
added to Gilligan's original thesis of gender-specific ethical out­
looks, the stereotypical femininity may safely be ignored in favor of 
more complex circumstances; the caring orientation in answering 
ethical dilemmas may be seen to be influenced strongly by many 
factors in addition to gender. 
Having moved away from specifically "feminine" typecasting 
for the ethic of care, how then are we to deal with Puka'sproblem of 
"regression" in care? Gilligan herself provides the framework for 
identifying a balanced, intelligible ethic of care (Puka's third level) 
with validity as a "mature" orientation alternative to that Justice­
based ethic, but she does not identify the lower stages flS such-her 
concern is with the understanding of the mature stage only. just as 
Kohlberg's work is primarily concerned with the identification and 
direction of the most mature level of justice-based moral discourse. 
Keeping in mind the variations in moral "maturity" influenced 
both by age and by social-relational status (as well as idealism, 
relativism, etc.), one way to get around Puka's objection is to con­
sider the presence of care as a virtue, as per the teachings of virtue­
theory inethics. To do this we mustmove from the descriptive realm 
to a more normative deSign, as found in the work of Nel Noddings. 
II 
Given the above deSCriptive background, what shape would a 
normative theory ofethlcal caring take? For Nel Noddings, itwould 
be additionally supplemented by expanded ideas of reciprocation, 
empathy and specific forms that relationships can take. Noddings 
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begins her account of caring. as Gilligan did indirectly by invoking 
Chodorow, with the concept of mothering. It is the mother--child 
relationship that is the paradigmatic case for her system, with the 
roles of the mother, or "one--caring," and the child, "cared-for," with 
each role entailing special obligations toward the maintenance of a 
caring interrelationship. 
According to Noddings, the first thing required to establish a 
properly ethical caring relationship is knowledge of what preCisely 
this care entails, above and beyond the basic concerns of context, 
relationship and self-definition. Caring canbe many things, and she 
differentiates among caring for people, an "aesthetic" care for things 
and ideas and the ultimately undesirable form of care as a burden or 
onerous obligation (Nod dings, p. 9). Caring, in the aesthetic sense, is 
comparable to the idea of preference, or caring for one thing over 
another, or having an interest ina particularidea or object rather than 
another person. Caring as concern or burden also deals with objects, 
in the sense of there existing an obligation to attend to these objects 
in a certain way (such as "caring" for one's lawn or some other 
personal possession). It is a mistake, however, to substitute either of 
these two forms of the concept for pl'operethical caring; for Noddings, 
ethical care should neither involve an abstract, aesthetic preJerence 
for certain persons nor an attitude of onerous obligation (such as in 
caring for one' s elderly, in firm grandmo ther as ifshe were a burden) 
(Noddings, pp. 12-13). According to Noddings, the inclination to­
wards caring for people interactively, which is the "mothering" 
paradigm's primary component, is the basic "premoral" virtue of 
care upon which most care-ethical considerations should be based 
(Noddings, pp. 13-15). 
The ethical ideal that supports this virtue is rooted in "the natural 
sympathy human beings feel for each other and the longing to 
maintain, recapture or enhance our most caring and tender mo­
ments" (Nod dings, p. 104). The effod required, first and foremost, is 
the holding of a "cating attitude," where care is as per the previously 
stated ideal, rather than a matter of trouble (Noddings, p. 13).3 To 
show how this attitude should be applied, Noddings divides the 
caring inten'elation into the roles of "one--caring" and "cared-for." 
3 The example of care as burden is twofold, either where care is equated with 
worry or where caring for someone becomes worry, such as is seen with Noddings' 
Mr. Smith, who must care for his ailing mother who is in a nursing home. 
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The role of the "one-caring" is primarily the keeping of this 
attitude insucha waythat the "cared-for" is the total of all ofthe one­
caring's attention in those matters in which they must relate to one 
another. The one-caring is obliged to do whatever is necessary to 
help thecared-forgrowas a personand fulfill herself (Noddings, pp. 
60-74). In any relation, the approach of the one-caring is one of 
engrossment, of an almost complete empathy with the cared-for's 
best interests and needs. The one-caring is perceived by the cared­
for as one who "accepts, embraces and leads upward," a presence of 
ultimate support and belief; in short, it is the role of the mother, and 
for Noddings, the ideal teacher (Noddings, p. 67). 
The caring attitude, however, is not something incumbent upon 
the "one-caring" alone-reciprocation is requ:ired in Noddings' 
conception of care. Inher "mothering" example, the cared-for gives 
back receptivity of the one-caring's efforts, and it is the capacity to 
respond in this fashion that delimitswhere the pOSSibility for a caring 
relation begins and ends (Noddings, p. 86). The cared-for has, in a 
sense, a certain obligation to grow and flourish under the one­
caring'sministrations; this is the only way inwhich a caring relation 
can continue, such that the one-caring's absorption remains en­
gaged. The role of the cared-for as respondent is what sets caring f01' 
persons apart from caring for animals or material objects 01' ideas­
none of the latter are really capable of the full responsiveness of a 
humanbeing, which allows the capability for caring as interaction 
rather than as concern or inclination (Noddings, pp. 148-170):1 
How does one make a decision as one-caring? The root desire for 
the one-caring (our ethical agent) is attention to the needs (and 
specifically the possible pain) of the cared-for(s) involved. Then she 
must consider the situation. All of this is supported by Gilligan and 
N oddings alike. It is supplemented, however, by Noddings' under­
standing of care as a virtue and care as a direction based not only on 
fear of hurt or maintenance of connection or empathy, but also a 
positive absorption in the situation of the cared-for by the one­
caring; Gilligan shows empathy, butnot absorption. This canbe seen 
in the way in which Noddings presents care-ethical solutions to 
ethical dilemmas, and indicates the possibility of needing to involve 
4 Our relation to animals and plants can be caring, but only to the limits of their 
responsiveness, and our relation to objects and ideas is more distant still. 
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oneselfinanun-caring response to a problem, whichNoddings calls 
action under a "diminished ethical ideal" (Noddings, pp. 113-115). 
The primary example that Noddings gives is the case of the 
abused wife who kills her husband, faced with choosing the mainte­
nance of a relationship with him and his continuing well being over 
her own health and safety, as well as that of her children. She is 
obliged as one-caring to consider the needs of all concerned, and yet 
she is trapped if she does this-her situation is such that the only way 
to continue a caring relationship with her children and herself is to 
cease to behave as one-caring towards her husband (Noddings, p. 
114). She cannot (to use Noddings' words) "receive" hun (empathize 
with him, treat him as one-caring) to change his habits (or so the 
author would have us assume for the sake of argument), since all of 
his responses have only an abusive direction to go in. She must 
choose to act then without reception, and without caring reciproca­
tion, and is thereby able to kill him to save herself and her children. 
From the possibility of a "diminished" ethical capacity, we may 
see the extreme complexity that a care-ethic entails. For the ba ttered 
wife, there is no simple decision (children and self over husband). As 
one-carmg, she must attempt to approach all parties involved, the 
antagonistic husband as well as the children, in a caring. receptive, 
absorbed fashion; this is comparable to some of the difficulty faced 
by the women in Gilligan's abortion study, who were forced to 
approach the felus, their friends, family, lovers, etc., to make the 
decision appl'opriate to their situations, as well as doctors and other 
official presences. Around the ethical one-caring, there are "circles 
and chains" of connected lives and personalities that must be ac­
counted for in any decision, and there is no simple one-caring/ 
cared-for relationship to go on; one-caring is also one cared-for in 
many cases, and the state of the relationship between a person and 
her/his spouse is different from the same person's relationship to 
her/his child, or to a doctor or other "official" type (Noddings, p. 27). 
In light of Gilligan's earlier revelations about the caring voice in 
moral orientation, what Noddings presents would seem to be pre­
cisely the proper sort of form for a care ethic to take. It is inclusive of 
relationship, of the positive nature of continuing relation to others 
that gives attention to specific contextually relevant aspects of any 
problem, encourages (in fact, requires) empathy, defines the self in 
relation to others within an ethical framework and strongly empha­
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sizes the importance, relevance and strengths of caring as a moral 
standpoint. It does, however, stand with a flaw that should be dealt 
with, namely the beginnlng assumption of mothering. This, as in 
Gilligan, leaves Noddings' work open to the feminist criticism of 
caring as the slave-mentality of women rather than an alternative 
method open to many. Noddings' model ofmothering additionally 
provides the difficulty of caring as a superior-inferior relationship 
model, so that the attitude of the one--caring, although it is possible 
that Noddings did not intend it to seem so, may be seen as patroniz­
ing orpatemalistic even in its attention to reciprocation. Hermother/ 
teacher is in many senses much like the classical model in Greek 
philosophy of the Lover/Beloved distinction, which most definitely 
posits a superior-to-inferior, subject-to-object orientation.5 It pre­
sents a version of the care ethic that is convenient for exposition, but 
possibly faulty in practice. 
Theproblem of derogatory" femininity" and ofsuperior/subject 
to inferior/object relation models can, of course, be repHed to by 
Gilligan's original contention of theme, and by the understanding 
that Noddings intends to show a more complete reciprocity in simple 
terms. A better way, however, to get around the sex-based objections 
to both of these is to remove the caring system's basis from the 
mothering metaphor and instead examine it in a way that more 
completely expresses what both Gilligan and Noddings attempted 
to demonstrate in a care-ethic. This can be achieved by changing to 
the metaphor of care-ethical action as a role playing game. 
III 
Most of us are familiar with one or another type of role playing 
game, ranging in complexity from the simple design of "cops and 
robbers" to more mechanically complex role-playing fantasy games 
or the type of role-playing exercises that actors use in the everyday 
practice of their occupations. However different in scope they might 
be, however, an of these games have some crucial features in com­
mon, and it is these fea lures which, when connected, will provide us 
with a clearer metaphor for the ethics of care. 
The first important matter at hand for role playing games, as for 
5 Plato, the Symposium. 
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any game, is the question of the rules. In the case of any role playing 
game, there are some which, no matter what the rest of the game may 
be about, remain constant and this is particular I y relevant because of 
what rules serve to do: rules create the world of the game, and, like 
the laws of nature, determine what is and is not possible within the 
game itself for the players (E, p. 27). The idea of rules as "laws of 
nature" is especially important in a role-playing game, however, . 
because of the peculiar lack of physical limitations (such as a game­
board and pieces) to the sphere of game-reality. The rules, specifi­
cally in the sense in which they regulate what the game's "charac­
ters" may do in a given situation, thus define the context of the 
situations of play, above and beyond simply designating the means 
and proper procedures leading towards victory. 
Games of any kind usually have a goal of some sort for the 
players to achieve, thus constituting "victory" and the completion of 
the game. h1 role-playing games, however, it often appears that the 
game is open-ended-there is no specific moment, at the end of a 
chain of actions, that constitutes a "win." Take a very simple game, 
for instance, such as that ever-popular mainstay of childhood, "cops 
and l'Obbers." The first thing that becomes apparent, within the very 
simple explicit rules of the game itself, is that there are either many 
small victories possible (cop catches robber; robber evades cop) such 
that any protracted amount of play-time consists of many "games" 
of "cops and robbers," orno real, defined point of "victory" at all. This 
line of thought aSSlUnes that it is a specific chain of actions towards 
a pre-arranged goal that players must reach in a particular manner, 
so as to claim success, which is naturally the way most other sorts of 
games (chess, solitaire, Parcheesi, etc.) function. In the case of a role­
playing game though, success is defined, notin terms ofa directional 
goal, but in terms of a developmental one; to be a good role-player, 
one must develop one's "character" within the framework of the 
rules of game-reality. 
Characters, in role-playing games, are the roles inplay which the 
participants take on and attempt to fulfilL In "cops and robbers," the 
roles are the "cops and the robbers," obviously, and victory in this 
game is defined in terms, no tof the achievement of specified success, 
but in terms of being a good cop, or a good robber. The rules of the 
game are simple, vague and aimed only at constructing the roles­
children who play the game often create whole "plots" within which 
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their character-development can maneuver. Inmore complex role­
playing games, the idea of "characters" and their interaction with a 
"plot" is explicitly set forth as the primary directive of play (such as 
in mass-market role-playing games). 
The basic strategy ofplayinsuch a game, where the character and 
its development is the ulterior end of all game-action, is something 
to be approachedprimarily onthe level of constructing an identityin 
relation to the other players and the collectively created plot, byway 
of the specific units of play-movement, those being interactive 
situations. From the beginning of the game, the rules specify the 
character's general attributes, positions, possessions, etc. (the cops 
alwayshave guns and radios, and are motivated towards the protec­
tion of the law and all other attitudes that go with that motivation), 
and herlhis basic situation relative to the other players and their 
roles. Beyond that, however, prettymuchanything goes. In the more 
complex role-playing games, a plot is often created to give the 
players a more explicit framework within which to develop their 
characters, but plots begin and end. Player-characters go through 
many plots, until their existence is terminated, either in the course of 
play or by the player's wishes, and these plots provide situations that 
allow the characters to become further developed, in both physical 
and psychological attributes.6 Again, the point of the game is charac­
ter development, a feature of role playing that carries over even to 
role-playing exercises used for more businesslike purposes (such as 
role-playing to learn about sexual harassment, where character 
development takes on an added meaning). 
As previously mentioned, the basic "unit" of play in a role­
playing game is a situation; in "cops and robbers," it may be the 
criminal act that caused the character roles to intersect, while in 
another game it might be something as mundane as a meeting in a 
park or as violent as hunting down monsters. Within this unit 
6 In fantasy role-gnmes, for example, the player-characters usually begin their 
"Jives"atLevel One, with some few possessions and an understanding of their basic 
abilities and traits. In the course of play, characters acquire new abilities and 
knowledge, new possessions and accumulate "experience points" towards the goal 
of reaching anotherLevel of character development, at which they can acquiremore 
and more abilities, knowledge, possessions, etc., and are able to go on ever more 
difficult (and potentially profitable) adventures. Adclitionally, many ofthese games 
also provide for psychological advancement ("Vampire: The Masquerade" is one of 
these). 
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situation, the characters exercise their roles and their capabilities in 
reaction to the situational context, and to each other-one can 
seldom find a role-playing game that one may play alone? Role 
development depends on types of relationship to external factors. In 
"cops and robbers," the opposition of the two primary roles is the 
basic developmental focus; in cooperational, rather than opposi­
tional games, teamwork is grist for the character development mill. 
The important thing to remember to win (i.e. to continuously create 
andimproveupon the details of the character) is how one's character 
can function inrelation to others, because character growth is largely 
dependent upon the outcomes of situational interactions. 
How does this type of game become a metaphor for care-ethical 
attitudes and procedures? There are some obvious fundamental 
similarities to the three elements of Gilligan's care-ethic, such as the 
importance of contextual relevance and relation to others, but it 
would appear to lose some of Noddings' weight upon personal 
absorption, as well as only very roughly approximating Gilligan's 
concern of personal identity formation. Itbecomes necessary to find 
some way in which role-playing can be connected, not only to the 
basic rudiments of psychological care-procedures. but also to an 
ideal, a basis for the application of said psychological influences. We 
are also provided with the opportunity to expand the discussion 
beyond the realm of masculine / feminine oppositions, as well as the 
chance to explore and give greater importance to Noddings' "circles 
and chains" of relation, free of the trap of superior-inferior / subject­
object relational modeling as a rigid standard. 
To begin with, it is important that we examine the shape the role­
playing metaphor gives to Gilligan's original thesis. This can best be 
done by bringing forth the theatrical side of ourmetaphor, as used in 
the work of Erving Goffman, specifically in the sense that role­
playing as a game and role-playing as theater are fundamentally 
7 The only ways that I could imagine to have role-playing without live role 
others are the "Choose Your Own Adventure" format books, which pre-set your 
options within a specified, predetermined role, and computer role-playing games. 
which, depending on the sophistica Han of the program. can either be CYOA forma ts 
or actually involve a looser, more freely played opportunity. In both cases, however, 
only the rudimentary mechanical development of character takes place; one cannot, 
with most computer games for example, undertake a personal change in one's life 
outside of the "you must find x by surviving the maze and killing off the monsters" 
sort of controlled situation. 
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similar in their usage of the presentation of specific roles in a 
controlled context. When Gilligan's subjects whoused the care-ethic 
described themselves and their moral lives, they spoke of, as men­
tioned above, the need to relate to others, via an often externally 
determined identity, in determinate situational cases. What this 
means, in Goffman's terms, is that people who use this ethical 
method can be said to be "on stage" (where the stage is roughly the 
same as the contextual game-field created by the rules in a role­
playing game), acting their parts both with other "performers" and 
with "audiences" (GoHman's examples include relations between 
shopkeepers and clients and between the staff and passengers on a 
luxury liner, as well as less formal cases of people visiting each 
other's homes for tea) (PS). 
Instead of characterizing interactive behavior in terms of its 
positive or negative perceived psychological value or gender con­
nection, GoHman begins and ends his study with observations of 
people interacting with each other, stated in terms of a theatrical 
framework; he claims to study "social life" in terms of the theater (PS, 
introduction). His primary starting point is the "social establish­
ment," "anyplace surrounded by fixed barriers to perception [places 
of business, homes] in which a particular kind of activity regularly 
takes place" (PS, p. 238). Within the social establishment, roles are 
assumed, such that there is performed behavior and "backstage" 
behavior; in role-playing as a game, we might say that there is, 
likewise, a division between character action (activity of the player­
in-character) and player action (action out-of-role or out of play). 
Performers and audiences make up "teams," such that everyone is, 
to some degree, a performer anda member ofthe audience all at once, 
and performances are interactions between teams taking on both 
functions (PS, pp. 178-180). In the same way, players of a role­
playing game interact as "teams" with the situations of play-cops 
and robbers relate to each other bothin and out of character, andwith 
different agendas inmind, and fantasy-gaming involves the interac­
tion of teams of players/characters with non-player personalities 
portrayed by a "game-master" or "storyteller." 
Contextual relevance, maintenance of relationship and concep­
tion of identity take on a slight twist, seen through GoHman's lens. 
Contextual relevance, in addition to indicating a tendency to deal 
with concrete situational cases instead of abstractions, can also be 
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seen as the practice of functioning in context instead of trying to 
escape from it, or, metaphorically, acting/moving/performing on 
stage or in the game. It indicates the great importance of the numer­
ous, almost overwhelmingly complex parts of any situation that 
necessarily effect decision-making procedures. Maintenance of rela­
tionship, too, gains an added meaning, in the sense that it entails not 
simply the attempt to continue a relation, but a situation as well; it is 
the practice of staying "in character," and keeping the plot of the 
game alive, and additionally serves as the major vehicle by which 
roles are exercised in context. 
The most powerful andclarifying addition of Goffman to Gilligan, 
however, lies in the field of determination of identity. Like the 
student in Gilligan's study who spoke of herself as having layers of 
self. like an onion, GoHman presents an idea of self that is often 
externally determined identity-elements combined withmore inter­
nal, personal self-concepts (Gilligan, pp. 67-68). Instead of setting 
them up in a confusing opposition, Goffman separates the two into 
character and performer (character and player): "The self, as a 
performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific 
location whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature and to die; 
it isa dramatic effect arising fmma scene that is presented ..." (PS, p. 
253). Characters and impressions change from situation to situation, 
as the player plays them, out, and they develop into different things 
over time and given varying situational experiences, just as players 
themselves change and grow. Gilligan's student might just as well 
have expressed her confusion about her identity as a question of 
where the character and the player aspects of herself begin and end. 
Based on Goffman and Gilligan, we find an ethical care role­
player who functions by (as Noddings says) "receiving" the impres­
sions of others in complex determinate situations, as well as project­
ing (performing) role-impressions to others. The behavior is meant 
to maintain the medium ofthe interaction (maintain the relationship, 
keep the game going), both by using certain aspects of a character 
and attempting to further develop and perfect that character. 
If this is in fact the case, however, where does the moral motiva­
tion lie? It is one thing for a p]ayer, once engaged in play, to wish to 
continue the game. It is an entirely different motivation that leads a 
player to begin the game in the first place, and that is where 
Noddings andGoffmanmeet. Noddings, inproviding the idea of the 
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desire to continue positive "caring" relationships with others, gives 
a viable motivation to become a performer / player in this particular 
game, although she only relates the fulfillment of this need through 
the somewhat problematic forms of the mother--child, teacher­
student relationship models. While she alludes to a multitude of 
possible roles for ones-caring and cared-for' s, ("circles and chains"). 
Goffman's contribution is the addition of an understanding of the 
shifting quality of characters and role-identities ("effect[s] arising 
from a scene that is presented"), such that, while relationships differ 
as to whenone acts as performer or audience, (one--caring or cared­
for, ina loose comparison), they are not necessarily superior-inferior 
indesign. The desire to continue the game has more to do. in this case. 
with the desire to continue and learn to manage character impres­
sions,tocreatenewopportunitiesforinterrelationindifferentways.8 
As an ethical procedure. care as role-playing is based in a 
virtuous ideal (if we are to approach it as a mature and intelligible 
moral standpoint in the way that Gilligan and Noddings would 
advocate) of positive concern for others. and its methods are actions 
designed to permit the growth and continuation of that care, via role­
activity in relation to the particular situations of oneself and others. 
To "win" this game (Le. to be a positive or "good" moral agent in the 
care-ethical system), one must develop one's role-relations with 
others inafashion that fosters further relationship (whenapplicabl e) 
and self-development on all sides. thus maintaining the game. The 
action of play revolves around focusing the virtuous caring ideal 
(seen inGilligan as the desire to avoid harm to others and shown in 
Noddings as an empathy intended to be helpful) through the lens of 
relationship and reception (as performer and as audience). Through 
the metaphor of the role-playing game, the care-ethic is seen as a 
moral view incidentally, but not solely, dependent upon the gender 
of the agent (since people. as social creatures, interact regardless of 
gender), free of the problematic "feminine" mothering-orientation· s 
tendency towards stereotypical "female/inferior" interpretation. 
8 The chapter on "Impression Man"'gement" is especially relevant here. 
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